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3Abstract: This article investigates 
some of the problems in using the 
Geneva Convention as a way to 
evaluate internment operations 
in Ontario during the Second 
World War. It focuses on how the 
Canadian authorities dealt with the 
challenging issues of medical care 
and the repatriation of seriously ill 
German prisoners of war at camps in 
Gravenhurst, Espanola, and Monteith. 
This paper demonstrates that the 
treatment of German POWs in Ontario 
was dictated by the changing context 
of the war, the threat of reprisals 
against Canadian POWs in German 
hands, and the failed bilateral POW 
exchange negotiations between the 
Germany and Great Britain. A principle 
of reciprocity, not the application of 
international convention, governed 
the treatment and repatriation of 
German POWs.
In June 1940 the collapse of France and the real possibility of a German 
invasion of the British Isles brought 
the Mackenzie King government 
reticently to accept Britain’s request 
for the transfer of roughly 3,000 
German Prisoners of War (POWs) 
to Canada.1 By the summer of 1944, 
the number of German POWs in 
Canada had risen to 24,633, which put 
Canada in a unique position among 
the Commonwealth countries; by 
contrast Australia, the second largest 
dominion, had custody of only 1,585.2 
The disproportionate number of 
prisoners in Canadian captivity not 
only had profound implications 
for Canadian foreign policy among 
Allied states, but also the treatment 
of POWs themselves. One of the 
most challenging issues the Canadian 
authorities faced during these years 
was providing adequate medical care 
for the thousands of German POWs 
held in internment camps across 
the country. While historians have 
widely assumed that the Geneva 
Convention provided a standard for 
the treatment of sick and wounded 
prisoners, this was not always the 
case. Their treatment hinged on 
several factors: the changing context 
of the war, the failure of bilateral 
POW exchange negotiations, and the 
fear of reprisals against Canadian 
prisoners in German captivity.3 
This article explores some of 
the problems inherent in using the 
Geneva Convention as a yardstick 
for evaluating internment operations, 
and specifically focuses on how the 
Canadian authorities dealt with the 
particularly challenging issues raised 
by medical care for German POWs 
in Ontario from 1940 to 1946. Using 
a variety of camp medical reports 
and records from the Mixed Medical 
Commissions, the paper focuses on 
three camps: Gravenhurst (Camp 20), 
Espanola (Camp 21), and Monteith 
(Camp 23). While some historians 
have described how Canadian 
authori t ies  provided suitable 
shelter, clothing, and food, and also 
permitted POWs to work on labour 
projects, many have neglected to 
explore how authorities managed the 
health and safety of German POWs, 
and, more particularly, addressed 
the Geneva Convention’s provisions 
for repatriation of prisoners on 
medical grounds.4 According to one 
source, about 151 German POWs and 
Enemy Merchant Seamen (EMS) died 
whilst in Canadian captivity, many 
of whom suffered from maladies 
and ailments which, according the 
Geneva Convention, required them to 
be repatriated to a neutral country.5 
Yet the Canadian authorities did 
not always apply the convention. In 
important instances, the changing 
context of the war effectively dictated 
the treatment of German prisoners 
and the development of internment 
operations in Canada. The purpose of 
this paper is not to blame Canadian 
authorities for not always adhering to 
various articles of the convention, but 
rather to demonstrate the conflicts 
between ideals in the waging of war 
and often difficult realties.
Measuring Efficacy in 
Internment Operations, 1940-46
Many historians of German POWs in Canada have used 
the Geneva Convention as a litmus 
test to evaluate the overall efficacy 
of domestic internment operations.6 
In this way, the Geneva Convention 
has become the focal point in the 
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4history of POWs in Canada, with 
the central claim that the actions of 
Canadian authorities were justified 
by international law. These historians 
imply that Canada applied the 
convention uniformly and with 
very few exceptions.7 This type of 
interpretation is misleading for a 
number of reasons, not least because 
it portrays contemporaries as using 
the convention as some type of 
gauge by which they measured their 
actions, but it also discards other 
considerations that significantly 
affected the treatment of POWs in 
Canada, such as the threat of reprisals 
against Canadian POWs in Germany. 
For example, in the summer of 1941 
the German government, through 
the Swiss Consul, demanded that 
African-Canadian personnel of the 
Veterans Guard of Canada (VGC) 
should not be permitted to guard 
German officers. The Canadian 
government recognized that “at 
the time [1941], shortly after the 
evacuation of Dunkirk, the number 
of British PW held by Germany was 
many times greater than the number 
of German PW captured by the British. 
Consequently, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and other Commonwealth 
Governments were most anxious 
to avoid any act which might give 
Germany the slightest excuse for 
reprisals.”8 By 1945, however, the 
Canadian government noted that 
“the number of German PW held 
by the British Commonwealth 
Governments now greatly exceeds 
the number of Commonwealth PW 
in German hands, and the danger 
of reprisals on this account has 
vanished.”9 While relief agencies 
like the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), Young Men’s 
Christian Association (YMCA), and 
the Swiss Consul did report on camp 
conditions, this example suggests 
that it would be naïve to assume that 
the requirements of the convention 
remained the top priority for all 
Canadian authorities for the duration 
of the war.
Martin Auger, whose work 
represents the most comprehensive 
attempt to explore German POWs 
in Canada, focused on internment 
operations in Southern Quebec.10 
Auger set out to show how Canadian 
internment operations worked in the 
region and “how strictly it abided 
by the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention.”11 By exploring the camp 
living conditions, how the prisoners 
were used on labour projects, and the 
various (re-)educational programs 
Canadian authorities offered POWs, 
he concludes that  internment 
operations in Quebec were a “home 
front victory” and “the fact that the 
Canadian government strictly abided 
by the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention in its treatment of both 
German civilians and prisoners 
of war shows that inmates were 
adequately treated in this country.”12 
Whether these findings are a result 
of the circumscription of his study 
remains debatable. For instance, 
given that many prisoners in Camp 
40 (Farnham), Camp 41 (Ile-aux-
Noix), Camp 42 (Sherbrooke), and 
Camp 43 (St. Helen’s Island) were 
religious refugees and civilians, it 
is hardly surprising that Canadian 
authorities successfully de-nazified 
them.13 
Auger’s conclusions are not 
without pedigree. In her unpublished 
master’s thesis, Stefania Cepuch came 
to similar conclusions regarding 
labour projects and the treatment 
of  German POWs in Ontario, 
which also resonated with John 
Joseph Kelly’s 1976 master’s thesis 
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German prisoners arrive at the train station in Quebec City, July 1940.
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5that explored internment camps 
across Canada during the Second 
World War.14 Although an in-depth 
historiographical analysis is beyond 
the scope of this paper, these few 
examples represent a broader trend 
in the literature. Significantly, these 
historians have used the same 
provisions of the convention to assess 
internment operations, namely those 
relating to the installation of camps 
(article 10), feeding and clothing 
POWs (article 11), providing for 
the intellectual and moral needs of 
the POWs (article 16 and 17), and 
paying POWs accordingly for work 
they did inside and outside of the 
camps (article 23). However, issues of 
health, safety, as well as repatriation 
on medical grounds (articles 70-75), 
have not been treated in the literature. 
Section II A of the convention, 
“Special Principles for Repatriation,” 
for example, required that “all sick 
prisoners whose condition is such as 
to render them invalids whose cure 
within a year cannot be medically 
foreseen” must be repatriated to a 
neutral country. Among the illnesses 
listed is “progressive tuberculosis” 
and “captivity neurosis.”15 The ICRC 
charged Mixed Medical Commissions 
with examining wounded and sick 
prisoners of war. The commissions 
were appointed by the ICRC at 
the outbreak of hostilities and 
comprised three members: two 
belonging to a neutral country and 
the third to the detaining power. If 
possible, the members of the neutral 
country were to be a physician 
and a surgeon and the commission 
would visit each POW camp at 
intervals not exceeding six months. 
After examining wounded and sick 
prisoners in Canadian captivity, the 
Mixed Medical Commission could 
either propose repatriation or refer 
a prisoner to a later examination, 
and, according to the convention, the 
detaining power must carry out the 
decisions within three months. 
Significantly, when the Geneva 
Convention was amended in 1949, 
the provisions governing the Mixed 
Medical Commissions changed so 
that “prisoners of war who, in the 
opinion of the medical authorities of 
the detaining power, are manifestly 
in a serious condition shall be 
repatriated without having to be 
examined by the commission.”16 This 
post-war amendment reflects some of 
the difficulties that both the Canadian 
authorities and the commissions 
encountered, and forced the ICRC 
to adopt a less stringent position 
on repatriation for medical reasons. 
That German prisoners throughout 
Canada died from various illnesses 
ranging from cancers to diabetic 
comas highlights some of the 
practical difficulties of adhering to 
international law in wartime. It also 
raises questions about the extent to 
which any allied country could abide 
by such quixotic guidelines given 
the immense logistical challenges of 
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German prisoners are searched by Canadian guards upon their arrival in Quebec City, July 1940.
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6safely transporting POWs during the 
Second World War.
An examination of medical 
records from camps in Ontario 
sheds light on many of the pressures 
and challenges facing Canadian 
authorities in the context of total 
war. It  also suggests that any 
investigation that uses the convention 
as a primary measurement of success 
is largely a result of teleological 
historical inquiry, imposing ex post 
facto considerations on Canadian 
authorities which deprive them 
of any individual contingency. 
Nonetheless, the medical records 
show that the Canadian authorities 
did almost everything they could 
to remedy illnesses and ailments. 
When it came to the repatriation of 
seriously sick or wounded prisoners, 
however, the Canadian authorities 
did not always act in accordance 
with the convention. In this way, we 
can see that the treatment of German 
prisoners in Canada was sometimes 
reasonable, but not because the 
convention acted as a universal and 
moral compass for the Canadian 
medical authorities.
Medical Conditions of POWs 
at Espanola, Gravenhurst, 
and Monteith, 1940-41
When the first prisoners of war arrived in Canada in 
1940, the Canadian authorities 
hurried to modify existing buildings, 
reformatories, fortifications, and 
other structures so they could be 
used as internment camps. Not 
surprisingly, some of these camps, 
like Camp 22 in Mimico, Ontario, 
required significant alterations and 
were shut down earlier than others.17 
Nonetheless, all of the internment 
operations in Canada were equipped 
with a camp hospital, which provided 
POWs diagnoses and treatments for a 
wide range of maladies and ailments. 
Some of the first prisoners to arrive 
were Enemy Merchant Seamen 
(EMS) and other German military 
personnel ,  including downed 
Luftwaffe airmen. For the most part, 
the earliest medical records from 
camp hospitals reveal that German 
prisoners did not suffer from wounds 
acquired in battle. In 1940, the weekly 
medical reports from the camp at 
Monteith, which housed both civilian 
internees and POWs, suggest that 
tonsillitis, influenza, and grippe were 
the most common ailments from 
which the prisoners suffered. From 
7 September to 5 October 1940 alone, 
sixteen POWs were hospitalized for 
influenza and grippe, while from 31 
August to 5 October nine prisoners 
had been treated for tonsillitis.18 A 
similarly high number of prisoners 
suffered from tonsillitis at Espanola, 
a camp which held German military 
personnel from 1940 to 1943 and later 
became a transfer camp for repatriates 
heading for neutral countries. In just 
one week in August 1940, the camp 
hospital held eleven prisoners with 
tonsillitis, and, in a single day, on 
22 August 1940, five POWs were 
admitted for the same ailment.19 Other 
illnesses that the Canadian medical 
authorities diagnosed early during 
the war included scabies, various 
boils, gastro-enteritis, rheumatism, 
venereal disease,  and various 
forms of bronco-pneumonia. The 
documentation from Gravenhurst, a 
camp established for German officers 
that operated from 1940 to 1946, 
A view of Camp No.23 at Monteith, Ontario.
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7highlights that POWs there suffered 
from similar issues.20 
By 1941, the weekly medical 
reports from the camp hospitals 
reflect the changing demographics of 
the camps. Some prisoners transferred 
from the transit camps in Quebec 
experienced complications from 
preexisting gunshot wounds, such 
as infection, and a host of muscular 
and sinew-related complications. 
This was the case with G. Kemen who 
in March 1941 arrived at Espanola’s 
camp hospital to be treated for a deep 
gunshot wound to his left ilium. At 
the same time, another prisoner, H. 
Karlinger, received treatment for a 
gunshot wound to the left hip, while 
another inmate had been hospitalized 
for nerve lesions on the left thigh.21 
In addition to treating wounds 
suffered during battle, the Canadian 
government also began combating 
an outbreak of tuberculosis (TB) in 
1941. Fears of this communicative 
disease were also heightened given 
the constant ebb and flow of prisoners 
travelling to other camps in Canada. 
When in 1942 U-boats began to 
operate in the St. Lawrence, Canadian 
authorities were cognizant of the fact 
that German EMS interned in Quebec 
camps could escape and reach U-boat 
crews along the shores of the river 
and gulf. It is no surprise, then, that 
EMS were usually transferred to 
Ontario camps, far removed from 
the possibility of being picked up 
by fellow German mariners.22 In an 
effort to control the spread of TB 
resulting from internee transfers, on 1 
March 1941, the Canadian authorities 
decided to establish a specialized 
hospital at Espanola for the isolation 
and treatment of internees from 
across the country.23 On 10 January 
1943, for example, T. Anslinger was 
transferred to Espanola from Camp 
133 in Lethbridge, Alberta, while on 
20 March 1943 EMS W. Schroeder 
was transferred from Camp 42 in 
Sherbrooke, Quebec.24
These few cases illustrate broader 
trends found in the camp hospital 
medical reports and demonstrate that 
the Canadian authorities provided 
adequate treatment for the many 
ailments from which prisoners 
suffered, although under Section II 
A §3(a) of the convention prisoners 
suffering from progressive TB were 
to be repatriated.25 But what would 
happen if POWs were seriously ill 
or were diagnosed with terminal 
i l lnesses? When diagnoses or 
treatments fell outside the expertise 
of camp physicians, Canadian 
authorities made arrangements to 
send sick or wounded prisoners to 
outside hospitals. In Espanola, the 
camp physicians sent “gravely ill” 
prisoners to the Red Cross Hospital. 
In Monteith similar cases were 
sent to Anson General Hospital 
near Iroquois Falls, and as far as 
Chorley Park Military Hospital in 
Toronto. POWs from Gravenhurst, 
to the north of Toronto, were also 
sent to Chorley Park or Christie 
Street Hospital. When authorities 
assessed POWs as mentally ill, which 
was not uncommon, physicians 
diagnosed them using a variety 
of contemporary terms, such as 
schizophrenia, hysteria, or nervous 
anxiety, and camp authorities usually 
sent such cases to Westminster 
Hospital in London, Ontario. When 
H. Seppmann complained about 
serious abdominal pain on 29 July 
1941, camp physicians diagnosed 
him with “hysteria” and discharged 
him from the camp hospital shortly 
thereafter. In another instance, on 9 
August 1941, doctors concluded that 
Gefreiter K. Altenkirch had “nervous 
A view of Camp No.21 at Espanola, Ontario.
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8instability.”26 Although beyond the 
scope of this paper, cases of mental 
illness among POWs deserve an 
examination of their own as they 
appear frequently in internment 
records. 
It is cases of seriously ill prisoners 
where issues of repatriation on 
medical grounds become increasingly 
difficult to assess. From the records 
of camp hospitals, which detail 
admissions and discharges from both 
camp and outside hospitals in cases 
of grave illness, we can see that some 
POWs who suffered from serious 
illnesses like nephritis, cancers, 
osteomyelitis, or coronary thrombosis 
were eligible for repatriation on 
medical grounds. Yet, prisoners 
suffering from these types of diseases 
were more often than not denied 
repatriation and some later died from 
their conditions. Not until 1945 and 
1946 did the camp medical authorities 
at Espanola, Gravenhurst, and 
Monteith begin repatriating sick or 
wounded POWs, and until that point 
repatriation on medical grounds 
was seldom granted. Canadian 
authorities only began to consider 
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POW funeral in Canada circa 1942. It is 
interesting to note the prominence of 
the Nazi flag and swastika as well as the 
presence of a Canadian honour guard.
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9repatriating sick and wounded 
prisoners once victory in Europe 
became an increasing probability. 
It was the changing context of the 
war that dictated who would be 
repatriated and on what grounds, 
not necessarily the application of 
international convention.
Mixed Medical Commissions 
and Repatriation during 
War, 1942-46 
Th e  f i r s t  M i x e d  M e d i c a l Commission met in Canada 
on 4 August 1942 to discuss their 
work and itinerary. The commission 
consisted of two Swiss doctors, 
Edouard Ceresole and Willi Rieben, 
as well as Canadian medical officer 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfrid Warner. 
Between 11 and 13 September 1942 
the Commission visited the camps at 
Gravenhurst, Monteith, and Espanola 
and examined 75 POWs.27 The 
selection of prisoners for examination 
involved the camp medical officers as 
well as the camp leader. These steps 
were outlined in a report submitted 
to External Affairs by Gravenhurst’s 
interpreter, Capt. M. Cramtschenko, 
following the second tour of the 
Commission in autumn 1943.28 When 
the Department of External Affairs 
informed the camp commandant 
that the Mixed Medical Commission 
was to examine prisoners, the 
commandant forwarded this news 
to the camp leader, who in turn 
informed the rest of the POWs. 
The camp leader explained that, 
according to the Geneva Convention 
(article 70), each prisoner had the 
right to request an examination 
that could lead to repatriation. The 
names of those POWs wishing to 
be examined were submitted to the 
camp leader and then forwarded to 
the commandant. The interpreter 
at Gravenhurst claimed that many 
POWs, regardless of their condition, 
submitted their names in hopes of 
being selected for repatriation, and 
this forced the Canadian medical 
authorities to adopt a more stringent 
posi t ion on how POWs were 
nominated to see the commission. 
To detect cases of feigned illness, the 
authorities at Gravenhurst devised 
and implemented a preliminary 
medical commission that consisted 
of two Canadian medical officers and 
screened cases to expedite matters 
and facilitate the commission’s work 
once it began. This preliminary 
screening of POWs was questionable 
insofar as the provisions of the 
convention are concerned (article 
70 a-c). The two Canadian medical 
officers who carried out the screening 
were ipso facto not neutral and 
therefore jeopardized the impartiality 
of the process. Nevertheless, some 
of the records suggest that by 1943 
other internment camps had also 
implemented preliminary medical 
commissions and followed a similar 
procedure.29
One reason why Canadian 
a u t h o r i t i e s  p e r s i s t e d  i n  t h e 
preliminary screenings was to 
combat a more worrying problem 
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In 1970 all German POWs who died in 
Canada during the Second World War, 
along with a small number from the First 
World War, were reinterred at Woodland 
Cemetery in Kitchener, Ontario. The 
cemetery contains 187 German burials. 
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general,  Major-General H.F.G. 
Letson submitted a letter, along 
with excerpts of complaints about 
Dr. Rieben, to the secretary of state 
for External Affairs and inquired 
whether it would be possible to 
replace Rieben in preparation for 
the commission’s second tour.32 
According to this documentation, 
almost every camp medical officer 
or commandant submitted a formal 
complaint regarding Dr. Rieben’s 
comportment, attitude, and position 
towards the German POWs. In one 
instance, a Gravenhurst authority 
claimed that “the attitude of the 
Chairman [Dr. Ceresole] and Col. 
Warner was distinctly neutral and it 
struck me personally, that they were 
anxious to carry out the principles 
laid down in the Geneva Convention 
– but this cannot be said of the third 
member, Dr. Rieben.” The medical 
authority, who was not identified 
in the report but was likely Captain 
F.W.K. Tough, continued by offering 
one example of Rieben’s conduct: 
A P.O.W Officer had been in a 
Sanitorium in Switzerland in 1938 
for three months only. No evidence 
whatever was offered that he had 
ever suffered from Pulmonary T.B. 
He remained well for four years. Two 
months ago he developed a slight 
cough and, since he is a professional 
singer, he was naturally worried. In 
addition to my own, I obtained the 
opinions of two lung specialists. He 
was radiographed and his sputum 
examined. The result was entirely 
negative. The Chairman and Col. 
Warner concurred but Dr. Rieben 
recommended repatriation on the 
grounds that if Pulm. T.B. were not 
present now, it might develop at 
some future time.33 
than that of POW malingering: 
the disruptive attitude of Dr. Willi 
Rieben, one of the Mixed Medical 
Commission’s members. Jonathan 
Vance has explored some problems 
with repatriating Canadians held in 
German captivity and the frustration 
many Canadian politicians and 
bureaucrats shared as a result of 
futile negotiations between detaining 
powers.30 Vance found that during 
the Second World War only 250 of 
the roughly 10,000 Canadian POWs 
in German, Italian, and Japanese 
hands were granted repatriation 
on medical grounds, despite the 
fact that by the spring of 1941 there 
were over 1,200 POWs on both sides 
that had been recommended for 
repatriation.31 As Vance rightly points 
out, it was a series of diplomatic 
obstacles and self-interest on the part 
of the Canadian government that 
hindered efforts to return prisoners 
to neutral countries. Although 
Vance’s work addresses some of 
the problems involved in Canadian 
and Allied negotiations, one of the 
most significant obstacles to the 
repatriation of POWs in Canada lay 
in the Mixed Medical Commissions, 
in no small part resulting from the 
actions of Dr. Rieben.
Fol lowing the  complet ion 
of the commission’s first tour in 
Canada in 1942, the army’s adjutant-
Left: Major Burkhardt, a Luftwaffe 
medical officer, checks on a sick 
German POW, March 1945.
Below left: German POWs undergoing 
dental treatment at Camp 132 near 
Medicine Hat, Alberta.
Ca
na
di
an
 W
ar
 M
us
eu
m
19
84
05
79
-0
35
Li
br
ar
y 
an
d 
Ar
ch
iv
es
 C
an
ad
a 
PA
 1
29
14
7
Ca
na
di
an
 W
ar
 M
us
eu
m
 2
00
50
12
8-
02
9
8
Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss3/2
11
S i m i l a r  s t a t e m e n t s  w e r e 
submitted to External Affairs or 
National Defence Headquarters 
by the authorities of other camps. 
Captain H.H. Harvie, a medical 
officer at Espanola, noted that Rieben 
“was arrogant, antagonistic and 
inflexible with other members of the 
Commission…His attitude towards 
me on a few occasions was rather 
belligerent and offensive, imputing 
that perhaps everything had not 
been done in a medical way.”34 
Recalling his experience with Rieben 
at Chorley Park Military Hospital, 
General J.W. Brennan maintained 
that Rieben was “over-anxious to 
have Prisoners-of-War transferred to 
Switzerland for treatment or to have 
them repatriated…he was persistent 
and annoying in his disagreement 
with opinions expressed by the 
Military Medical Officers.”35 A 
medical officer at Monteith, Gordon 
C. Kelly, complained that “in my 
opinion, Dr. Rieben has a rather 
aggressive cocksure manner which is 
often lacking in tact in relation to the 
medical judgements [sic] of the two 
older and doubtless more experienced 
members of the commission.”36 The 
majority of these complaints reveal 
that, at least in the minds of Canadian 
authorities, Rieben was “partisan” in 
his attitude towards the POWs and 
favored repatriation in most of the 
cases examined by the commission. 
One surgeon from Camp 31 in 
Kingston even referred to Rieben as 
displaying a “distinctly pro-NAZI 
attitude.”37 The records also show 
that his tendency of recommending 
repatriation often made the Mixed 
Medical Commission tours longer 
and increasingly more expensive, 
costs which the Canadian government 
incurred.38
Other than the myriad complaints 
submitted against Rieben, the record 
concerning him is fragmentary. When 
Rieben and Ceresole were appointed 
by the ICRC their curriculum vitae 
were sent to External Affairs. From 
these records we know that Rieben 
was born in 1913 in Interlaken 
and studied medicine at Zurich, 
Lausanne, Oxford, Berne, and also 
Harvard Medical School from 1938 to 
1939. He took the Massachusetts State 
Board Examination in 1940, moved to 
California to work in the San Francisco 
County Hospital from 1940 to 1941, 
and in late 1941 obtained a position 
at Stanford University Hospital. 
In addition to these professional 
qual i f i ca t ions ,  R ieben  was  a 
lieutenant in the Swiss field artillery 
in 1934 and, in 1939, was promoted 
to premier lieutenant.39 According 
to Canadian authorities, however, 
these qualifications had no bearing 
on his attitude and comportment 
during the commission’s tour. Other 
correspondence, between Under 
Secretary of State R. H. Coleman 
and Col. H. DesRosiers, deputy 
minister of national defence (army), 
reveals that replacement of Dr. 
Rieben became a central objective 
before the commission’s next tour 
began in 1943.40 On 6 October 1942, 
Rieben resigned from the commission 
and returned to the United States, 
and was replaced by another Swiss 
national, Dr. Friederich Stocker.41 
It is no coincidence that this 
controversy took place just a month 
after the failed Dieppe Raid in August 
1942 in which many Canadians were 
taken prisoner. This is where Vance’s 
work on the diplomatic wrangling 
be tween  Al l i ed  and  German 
governments helps contextualize the 
internal Canadian problems involving 
the commission. The complaints 
levelled against the commission for 
liberally recommending repatriation 
to German POWs coincide with the 
failure of bilateral agreement between 
The officers’ quarters and hospital at Monteith.
9
: “When suitable arrangements could be made” The Geneva Convention, Medical Treatment, and the Repatriation of German POWs in Ontario, 1940-46
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
12
the UK and Germany to exchange 
sick and wounded prisoners.42 In 
addition, these complaints came to 
light around the same time as the 
shackling controversy of 1942-1943, 
which also began after Dieppe in 
August 1942.43 Upon confiscating an 
Allied document that recommended 
Canadian troops bind all Germans 
taken prisoner “to prevent the 
destruction of their documents,” 
the German government responded 
by shackling Canadians captured at 
Dieppe. The UK and Canada reacted 
to this measure by ordering that 
German POWs in Canada also be 
bound, which resulted in various 
types of resistance exercised by 
the POWs ranging from passive 
resistance at Espanola and Monteith 
to outright violence at Camp 30 in 
Bowmanville.44 
All  of  these issues broach 
important questions, both procedural 
and substantive, and are important 
to consider when examining the 
repatriation process in Canada. 
Was Rieben “pro-NAZI” in his 
approach towards repatriation, 
or was he simply abiding by the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention 
and fulfilling the mandate of the 
ICRC? Rieben’s background and 
professional experience suggest that 
he was certainly qualified to make 
diagnoses and recommendations. 
But travel to remote parts of Canada 
and the experience of examining 
prisoners in camps that were not 
always pristine and did not always 
possess adequate facilities likely 
affected Rieben’s decisions during 
the commission’s  tour.  While 
Canadian medical authorities might 
have perceived Rieben as arrogant 
or antagonistic, it is difficult to 
believe that his recommendations for 
repatriation were entirely spurious. 
On the contrary, criticism of facilities 
and treatment also came from other 
Allied medical officers. When British 
psychiatric consultants visited 
Canadian internment camps in 
December 1943, they referred to the 
treatment of mental illness among 
German POWs as “very backward.”45
Rüdiger Overmans has examined 
some of the difficulties in repatriation 
between Allied and Axis governments, 
and argues that because of the 
ambiguity with which articles 70 to 
75 (concerning repatriation) were 
formulated, most belligerents failed 
to agree on a procedure for consent to 
repatriate.46 The Canadian authorities 
abided by the convention in that 
the Mixed Medical Commissions 
completed their tours of the camps, 
but the vagueness of the document 
allowed Canadians to withhold sick 
and wounded prisoners despite 
their conditions and, given the 
disproportionate number of Germans 
in Canadian captivity compared to 
Canadians in German hands, POWs 
represented important political 
leverage in negotiations between the 
Commonwealth and Germany.
In spite of the controversy, the 
second Mixed Medical Commission 
began to plan its itinerary in June-
July 1943. This time the Directorate 
of Prisoners of War (DPW) was more 
prepared and sent out instructions to 
all camp commandants prior to the 
commission’s visit. The instructions 
asked camps to prepare nominal 
rolls of POWs to be examined under 
article 70 of the Convention and to 
submit the lists to National Defence 
The SS Lady Nelson was a Canadian hospital ship used to repatriate sick and wounded German prisoners of war.
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Headquarters by 7 March 1943. 
The directorate also advised that 
POWs who had been previously 
recommended by the commission 
for repatriation to Germany would 
n o t  b e  r e - e x a m i n e d . 4 7 C a m p 
medical authorities at Gravenhurst 
recommended that the commission 
examine 27 POWs, seven of whom 
suffered from gunshot wounds, three 
had fractured skulls, and had one 
lost an eye. At Monteith, the nominal 
roll for this commission included 31 
POWs and two civilian internees.48 
Of the 33 prisoners examined by the 
commission at Monteith, only nine 
were to be repatriated.49 Curiously, 
although the camp was operational 
and used as a transfer point during 
that year, the second Mixed Medical 
Commission did not visit Espanola.
The second Mixed Medical 
Commission was markedly more 
successful than the first, although 
it is difficult to determine exactly 
how many repatriates there were 
from each camp because much of the 
correspondence provides district- or 
Canadian-wide figures. On 23 August 
1943, Major-General Letson reported 
that 452 POWs, protected personnel, 
and civilians would embark on 
the hospital ship SS Lady Nelson. 
A total of 416 repatriates had been 
transferred to Espanola immediately 
following the report of the second 
commission, but this number also 
included civilian internees from 
Camp 70 in Fredericton.50 The 
commission’s third tour, set for 
the summer of 1944, examined 172 
POWs and civilian internees across 
Canada, a much lower figure than 
the commission’s second tour. Of 
the 172 prisoners, only three came 
from Gravenhurst while 31 were 
held at Monteith.51 This low figure 
may be explained by External Affairs’ 
warning issued to Germany in 1944 
that if they did not actively seek 
out prospective Allied repatriates, 
then German POWs in Canada 
would be taken off repatriation lists.52 
By late 1944, reasons for seeking 
repatriation included senility, 
arthritis, nervous debility, allergic 
asthma, and dysentery. In one day 
alone at Gravenhurst, four German 
officers were admitted to outside 
hospitals for cases of mental illness.53
By the end of war, the records 
of admissions and discharges from 
camp hospitals demonstrate that 
the Canadian government began 
repatriating POWs more liberally 
than they had in the past. This is 
particularly true of Monteith, which 
remained open until December 1946. 
Ailments that in previous years 
would have rendered prisoners 
ineligible for repatriation appear 
to have earned POWs repatriation 
with greater frequency. Minor 
injuries, such as dislocated knees and 
fractured bones, merited being sent 
to a neutral country, while at least 
one prisoner had been repatriated 
because of a hunger strike.54 In just 
under a month in May 1946, 23 POWs 
from Monteith were repatriated on 
the orders of the Canadian medical 
officers. This number is comparable 
to the total number of POWs at 
Monteith recommended to see the 
Commission in 1943.55 The reasons 
listed for repatriation ranged from 
arthritis to fever and minor fractures.
The Efficacy of the Geneva 
Convention and the Medical 
Conditions of POWs in 
Ontario
This article began by showing that historians cannot always 
assume the Canadian authorities 
used the Geneva Convention to 
guide internment operations. While 
the documentation sometimes makes 
reference to the convention regarding 
repatriation, there were other factors 
that more greatly influenced the 
treatment of German POWs, such as 
the threat of reprisals by Germany 
against Canadian POWs and the 
failure of bilateral repatriation 
negotiations. When examining the 
medical conditions of hospitals inside 
and outside of internment camps, we 
see that Canadian medical authorities 
provided adequate treatment for 
POWs suffering from a wide range 
of minor ailments. Importantly, 
they also established a separate TB 
hospital at Espanola to combat the 
spread of the disease. Assessing 
the treatment of German POWs 
becomes more difficult, however, 
when we consider those seriously 
ill or wounded prisoners who, by 
international convention, were 
eligible for repatriation to a neutral 
country. It is here that internment 
operations must be examined within 
the broader context of the war: the 
failed Dieppe Raid in which many 
Canadians were taken prisoner 
affected the treatment of Germans 
in Canadian captivity. As Vance 
has demonstrated, the failure of 
bilateral negotiations between 
Germany and the Commonwealth 
occurred at this time, along with the 
shackling controversy of 1942-43. 
The controversy involving Dr. 
Willi Rieben took place around 
this time as well. Although the 
Canadian authorities permitted the 
Mixed Medical Commission, under 
provisions of the convention, to tour 
internment camps across the country, 
one must ask whether the Canadian 
medical authorities vehemently 
opposed Rieben’s desire to repatriate 
the prisoners he examined because of 
the broader implications of sending 
German POWs back to Europe, or 
because of the message this would 
send to Germany in light of failed 
bilateral agreements. Additionally, 
we might also ask whether the 
language of internment operations 
was draped in the mantle of the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention 
in order to justify decisions made for 
more practical reasons. As some of 
the above examples demonstrate, the 
Canadian government was acutely 
aware of the threats Canadian and 
Commonwealth POWs faced if 
German POWs in Canada were 
maltreated. The Veterans Guard of 
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Canada went so far as to remove 
African-Canadian personnel from 
the view of German officers to avoid 
any complaints being submitted 
to the Reich through the Swiss 
Consul. This informal regulation 
was removed once the tide of war 
changed and the number of German 
prisoners greatly exceeded that 
of Canadian prisoners in German 
captivity. In this way, Canadian 
internment operations were guided 
by a principle of reciprocity.56
Camp medical records show 
that by late 1944 German prisoners, 
who were unlikely to be repatriated 
in previous years,  were being 
recommended for repatriation with 
greater frequency and for relatively 
minor ailments. This becomes clearer 
in 1945 and 1946, which suggests 
that the course of the war more often 
than not dictated the repatriation 
of prisoners. While POWs may 
have been eligible for repatriation, 
questions of safely transporting 
prisoners loomed large in Allied 
negotiations, especially after the 
torpedoing of the Arandora Star 
when she was carrying Italian and 
German internees on 2 July 1940.57 
There is another practical issue 
of central importance regarding 
repatriation during war: the Geneva 
Convention was devised and 
formulated in Europe where the 
borders of neutral countries are often 
only a few hours’ distance from the 
belligerents engaged in war. Canada, 
thousands of kilometres removed 
from the battlefields of Europe, by 
an ocean that was itself the scene of 
intense combat, presented a host of 
logistical problems, not least the vast 
distances within Canada between 
camps and major ports (e.g. Camp 
133 in Lethbridge, Alberta to Halifax, 
some 5,000 kilometres).
These challenges were addressed 
privately following the surrender of 
Nazi Germany in early May 1945. 
The Department of External Affairs 
arranged to meet with Colonel H.N 
Streight, commissioner of internment 
operations, and other senior officials 
involved in Canadian internment 
operations. The committee sought 
to deal with the immense logistical 
challenge of repatriating these 
prisoners. Although according 
to the Geneva Convention the 
repatriation of POWs had to take 
place immediately following the 
cessation of hostilities, the Canadian 
authorities could not have possibly 
transported such a large number 
of people back to Europe in such a 
short period of time. With this in 
mind, one of the first points upon 
which the committee agreed was that 
“no statement whatever should be 
made to the prisoners regarding the 
[Geneva] Convention.”58 After some 
debate, the authorities recognized 
that issuing a formal declaration of 
V-E Day in the camps would require 
some statement about the fate of the 
prisoners themselves. One member 
of the committee suggested that a 
statement be given to the POWs 
saying that the “repatriation of 
Ps/W would be undertaken when 
suitable arrangements could be 
made.” This, however, was quickly 
shot down by another member, as 
“it was pointed out that an article of 
the Geneva Convention states that 
repatriation is to be carried out ‘as 
soon as possible after the conclusion 
of peace’ and that any elaboration of 
this phrase was unnecessary.”59 Even 
after the war had officially ended, 
practical matters, not international 
convention, continued to guide 
internment operations.
Although this article has relied 
on documentation from Gravenhurst, 
Espanola, and Monteith, some of the 
ideas and problems presented here 
might very well apply to other camps 
throughout Canada. By focusing on 
the medical conditions of prisoners 
at three camps and some of the 
problems of repatriation during 
war, issues largely neglected in the 
historiography, it appears as if the 
Geneva Convention was not always 
a realistic measure of Canadian 
internment operations.
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